Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to investigate two related questions. First, is earnings management behaviour in private firms related to managerial ownership and if so, what form does the relationship take. Second, is there evidence of opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms. Design/methodology/approach -This study uses univariate and multivariate (regression) methodologies to examine the association between managerial ownership and earnings management in private firms. The study employs a data set of 1,223 large private UK firms. Findings -Evidence is presented indicating opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms. Specifically, firms with low managerial ownership appear to engage in more earnings management when faced with poor performance. Further, when firms report income-increasing discretionary accruals, the magnitude of abnormal accruals varies non-linearly with managerial ownership. Research limitations/implications -This study is limited by availability of data on sample firm ownership. This study uses cross-sectional data due to these limitations. Further research could investigate the relationships between earnings management and classes of shareholders other than managers in private firms. Practical implications -Policy implications of this work suggest that non-managing shareholders in private firms face considerable agency costs, in particular where managerial ownership is very low or very high. Originality/value -Pervasiveness of earnings management in private firms compared to public firms is well documented in the literature. There is limited extant research on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management in private firms. The novel aspect of this study is to present findings on the association between this behaviour, managerial ownership and firm performance in private firms.
Introduction
Do private firms exhibit opportunistic earnings management behaviour and to what extent, if any, does the earnings management behaviour of private firms vary with the degree of managerial ownership? These questions have real economic consequences. Firms may misdirect productive resources by altering their operations to manage earnings. Alternatively, varying accounting practice can distort reported firm performance, alter the allocation of cash flows between managers and shareholders, constrain market transparency and accumulate problems by shifting earnings through time. Examining these concerns in the context of private firms is pressing in light of private firms' role in the economy, uncertain agency costs incurred by private firms (Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005) and the sparse empirical literature examining earnings management within private rather than public firms.
Private firms are economically important entities. Privately held companies in the UK account for more than 99 per cent of companies by number and own approximately 60 per cent of corporate assets (Brav, 2009 ). In the USA, private companies create half of private sector output (Hope et al., 2013) and 52 per cent of employment (Nagar et al., 2011) .
In several characteristics relevant to the focus of this paper, private firms differ significantly from public firms. Ownership concentration and managerial ownership in public firms in the UK is significantly lower than in the private firms that make up our sample (Munari et al., 2010; Gregory-Smith, 2012 ) and both of these aspects of ownership structures in private firms exhibit significantly higher variation compared to public firms in the UK (Michaely and Roberts, 2011) . Due to the high costs of transactions in private firms' equity, ownership is extremely "sticky" in private firms (Nagar et al., 2011) compared to public firms.
Earnings management could differ between private and public firms for several reasons including greater information demands from investors and creditors and the amplified threat of litigation in public relative to private firms (Coppens and Peek, 2005; Givoly et al., 2010) . This reduced demand by outside investors for high-quality financial information may induce private firms to manage earnings to meet lender expectations, improve terms of trade or minimise taxation (Burgstahler et al., 2006) Opportunistic incentives arising from managers seeking to protect job tenure or maximise compensation may differ in public and private firms. These explanations could all result in earnings being treated distinctly by public and private firms (Givoly et al., 2010) . Extant research reports that earnings management is more pervasive in private rather than in public firms for a range of institutional settings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Liu and Skerratt, 2018) .
Given the differences apparent in the ownership characteristics and earnings management behaviour of public and private firms it is not obvious that empirical findings on earnings management behaviour in public firms will generalise to private firms. The economic importance of private firms adds further to the argument that the lack of empirical attention directed at these questions in private firms represents a significant gap in the literature on earnings management.
This study addresses these research questions by examining how earnings management, measured as discretionary accruals, varies with the shareholdings of the Managing Director (hereafter MD). We report two major findings. First, private firms exhibit opportunistic earnings management behaviour. Firms with low managerial ownership engage in more earnings management when faced with poor performance compared to firms with intermediate or high levels of managerial ownership. Second, the earnings management behaviour of private firms varies with managerial ownership when firms report income-increasing discretionary accruals and not otherwise. This relationship takes a non-linear U-shaped pattern whereby discretionary accruals are lowest in firms when the MD owns approximately 44 per cent of the equity in the firm.
This study makes two contributions to the earnings management literature. First, it extends the empirical work of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Liu and Skerratt (2018) documenting the magnitude of earnings management in private firms. This is achieved through exploring how discretionary accrual use varies with managerial ownership in private firms. Second, we examine whether the earnings management behaviours documented in poorly performing public firms are also observed in private firms (Chung et al., 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Givoly et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2013) . As the results of previous studies undertaken, for example, within the USA, have little generalisability to other nations (Givoly et al., 2010) it is also important to examine these concerns in a UK regulatory environment. Further, we report that concentrated ownership, prevalent in private firms, does not appear to function as an effective monitoring mechanism in preventing these behaviours.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and presents hypotheses. In Section 3, the sample and variables are described and the empirical method is outlined. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics for earnings management, ownership and other variables used in the study. This section also reports the regression estimates, which establish the relationship between managerial ownership and
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Earnings management earnings management and tests whether earnings management in a sub-sample of firms is driven by managerial opportunism. A discussion of these results and conclusions is provided in Section 5.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 2.1 Literature and Hypotheses Earnings management, the "[…] use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings" (Walker, 2013, p. 446 ) is a critical theme within accounting research. Academic literature examining this concern has developed from claims that earnings might be manipulated to signal private information about expected future cash flows to shareholders or influence third parties such as creditors, suppliers and employees (see Lintner, 1956 ). This process of earnings management has been reported to have real cash-flow effects for different firm stakeholders and is associated with self-serving behaviour by managers, shareholders and other firm actors.
This literature was re-focussed after Healy's (1985) seminal study which reported that US managers manipulate earnings to satisfy bonus targets and enhance their compensation. The literature has been advanced by re-testing and extending Healy's central thesis that managers manipulate earnings to maximise their remuneration, providing evidence of earnings management to maximise managerial compensation internationally (Walker, 2013) . Developments in this literature have included re-testing this proposition internationally, for different company forms and in distinct institutional settings, through examining the mechanisms by which earnings are opportunistically managed to maximise managerial compensation; how managerial ownership of firms may limit the managerial misuse of earnings management; and the linear or non-linear form of this relationship. These studies have focussed, nearly exclusively, on discretionary accruals as an accounting measure open to manipulation (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) .
Opportunistic earnings management is exercised in both good and poor years whereby earnings are raised or reduced, to achieve certain bonus thresholds or not to exceed these, enabling a CEO to appreciate the benefits of good corporate performance over multiple years (Holthausen et al., 1995) . This is important if managers' compensation or continued employment is sensitive to firms' accounting performance and managers have the ability, through discretion over the magnitude of accruals, to change the reported accounting performance of the firm. As accruals reverse over time there are also incentives for managers to "bank" good performance for future reporting by managing earnings downwards if they exceed the point which makes dismissal unlikely or a point which maximises compensation or another contractual or informal benchmark. For example, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) reported that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is greater at firms where the CEO's compensation is more sensitive to share price performance and that CEOs exercise unusually high amounts of share options in years where accruals are very high.
If opportunistic earnings management is motivated by managers' efforts to increase their proportion of firm cash flows at the expense of shareholders, the incentives driving this behaviour may be inversely related to managerial ownership. It is expected that MDs who own relatively little (or no) equity have distinct opportunistic incentives to mask poor firm performance, since they are more vulnerable to dismissal by shareholders. MDs who own a high percentage (or all) of the firm's equity do not have such incentives. Therefore, a significant difference is expected in the earnings management behaviour of firms with low and high equity owning MDs, when faced with poor firm performance. This interpretation was originally supported in the literature (Warfield et al., 1995; Gul et al., 2003) .
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Employing a meta-analysis of corporate governance and earnings management, García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2009), likewise, concluded that higher board ownership is associated with lower discretionary accruals. This said, consensus on this question has not emerged, with several authors documenting insignificant linear relationships between managerial ownership and earnings management (e.g. Klein, 2002; Koh, 2003) .
This impasse has been addressed by re-examining the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management and relaxing the assumption that this relationship is linear. A non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management may arise from different influences. Initially, while increasing managerial ownership may align the incentives of managers with shareholders, once managerial ownership crosses a threshold, managers may become entrenched (Short and Keasey, 1999) . This implies that outside shareholders have a diminished ability to effectively monitor managers and discipline non-value maximising behaviour (Morck et al., 1988) . Earnings management, by allowing the manager to disguise the underlying economic performance of the firm, may be associated with this behaviour. This entrenchment argument implies that discretionary accruals may be an increasing function of managerial ownership once it crosses a certain threshold.
Evidence of non-linear relationships between earnings management and various aspects of ownership structure and managerial pay has emerged for public firms, internationally. For example, a U-shaped relationship between insider ownership and the informativeness of earnings has been observed for East Asian (Fan and Wong, 2002) and Singaporean (Yeo et al., 2002) firms. Khan and Mather (2013) also found evidence of a U-shape relationship between earnings quality and managerial ownership for Australian public companies and reported that this is driven by income-increasing accruals. Despite the scope and dynamism of this literature, equivalent examinations of private firms have been limited in their number.
The incentives facing managers in private firms, and their opportunity to disguise true economic performance through discretionary accruals, may differ systematically from the situation in public firms. The highly concentrated ownership and high degree of insider ownership predominant in private firms (Brav, 2009 ) and the prevalence of long-term relationships between private firms and creditors (Vera and Onji, 2010) suggest that the role of financial statements in reducing information asymmetries between management and shareholders and between firms and creditors may be less important than in the case in public firms (Peek et al., 2010) . Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) reported significantly lower earnings quality in UK and European private firms, respectively, compared to public firms and attributed these findings to differing demands of shareholders and creditors for accounting information in public and private firms. Liu and Skerratt (2018) compared income smoothing behaviour of UK micro, small, medium and large private firms and reported that earnings management is six times higher in medium and large private firms compared to public firms and four times higher compared to small and micro private firms. This reduced demand for high-quality accounting information by stakeholders may be associated with an increased influence of incentives to manage earnings in private firms. As well as the opportunistic incentive, discussed earlier, private firms may manage earnings to improve the terms of trade available from suppliers and customers, to avoid breaching debt covenants or to minimise taxation liabilities.
We hypothesise that the opportunistic incentive to manage earnings [1] implies that discretionary accruals in private firms will be related to managerial ownership. This relationship may be linear or non-linear, there are plausible arguments to support either of these forms and there is empirical evidence indicating a linear and non-linear form of the relationship in public firms. We therefore posit two hypotheses on the relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals:
H1a. Discretionary accruals are negatively related to managerial equity ownership.
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H1b. Discretionary accruals and managerial ownership exhibit a U-shaped relationship.
As managerial ownership increases, discretionary accruals first decline and then increase.
We examine the interaction between poor firm performance, managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. For this analysis, we focus on the sample of income-increasing discretionary accrual firms only. Engaging in earnings management in the context of poor firm performance does not necessarily indicate managerial opportunism. This behaviour in private firms may be motivated by factors consistent with interests of shareholders, such as minimising taxation liabilities (Karjalainen, 2015) . Our second hypothesis arises from the opportunistic incentives of MDs who own low shareholdings to manage earnings upwards when firm performance is poor. Khan and Mather (2013) , examining public firms, reported a quadratic relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management; however, there is little extant evidence on whether such a relationship exists for private firms. Existing evidence suggests that the relation between managerial compensation and accounting performance in private firms is significantly stronger where managers own a low equity shareholding (Michiels et al., 2013) . The tenure of managers with a low (or no) shareholding may be contingent on accounting performance, providing a further possible incentive for managers owning a low shareholding to manage earnings. We posit that a poorly performing firm is incentivised to increase reported earnings using income-increasing accruals if its MD has a low shareholding. Conversely, an MD with a high shareholding has less incentive to disguise poor firm performance through earnings management:
H2. Firms with an MD owning a low shareholding will exhibit a higher degree of incomeincreasing earnings management compared with firms managed by MDs owning an intermediate or high shareholding, when firm performance is poor.
Data and empirical method
This section describes the data set, the sample selection procedures, variable construction and the empirical approach used to test the hypotheses.
Data, sample and variables
The research questions are addressed using a sample of 1,223 private UK firms. The sample is limited to firms classified as large by Companies House, as smaller private firms are exempt from returning complete accounts. Data are collected from the BvD FAME database, which is compiled from Annual Returns and Company Accounts filed with Companies House. Ownership data are from the Annual Return submitted in 2013 and financial and other variables are from the Annual Returns submitted in 2013 and 2014. To construct the managerial ownership variables, the identity of the MD is ascertained from Company Accounts and manually matched to the shareholder data. To ensure that we capture the direct and indirect ownership share of the MD, the sample is limited to firms in which 100 per cent of equity is owned by individuals. The fundamental measure of managerial ownership used in the study is the percentage of equity owned by the MD. Further variables are constructed from this to capture high and low levels of managerial ownership (variables defined in Table I ). While prior empirical research on accruals-based earnings management has adopted a variety of measures, we adopt absolute value discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings management. The most common approach is to assume that a firm's total accruals comprise non-discretionary and discretionary elements, with the former depending on the business activities of the firm and the latter arising from accounting choices or earnings management. Non-discretionary, or "normal" accruals, are most commonly estimated using 652 JAAR 19,4 one of several alternative specifications of the modified Jones Model (Walker, 2013) , where subtracting the non-discretionary accruals from the firm's total accruals yields an estimate of discretionary accruals. When estimating the modified Jones Model, we include an intercept (Kothari et al., 2005) ; adjust change in sales for the change in receivables to account for managerial discretion in the recognition of credit sales (Dechow et al., 1995) ; and use a cross-sectional industry-based sample (Bartov et al., 2000) . Total accruals are calculated on a balance sheet basis. For firm i in year t:
where for firm i at time t, TAC is total accruals, ΔCA is Change in Current Assets from year t−1 to year t, ΔCash is Change in Cash from year t−1 to year t, ΔCL is Change in Current Liabilities from year t−1 to year t, ΔSTD is Change in Short-Term Debt and current portion of Long-Term Debt included in Current Liabilities from year t−1 to year t, ΔTP is Change in Taxes Payable included in Current Liabilities from year t−1 to year t and DEP is Depreciation and Amortisation charge for year t. Abnormal working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Estimated using Defond and Park (2001) 
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The relationship between total accruals, discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals is as follows:
where for firm i at time t, TAC is total accruals calculated using Equation (1), NDAC is non-discretionary accruals and DAC is discretionary accruals calculated by subtracting NDAC from TAC. The modified Jones Model used to estimate NDAC employs the following OLS regression for each group of sample firms in a two-digit SIC industry sector [2] , in which there are at least ten firms:
DAC for firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, is as follows:
whereâ andb are the estimated coefficients from Equation (3), TA is Total Assets, ΔREV is Change in Revenue from year t−1 to year t, ΔREC is Change in Receivables from year t−1 to year t, PPE is Gross Property, Plant and Equipment and all other variables are as defined previously. It is assumed positive discretionary accruals arise from income-decreasing earnings management and negative discretionary accruals result from income-increasing earnings management by firms. As firms may engage in earnings management to avoid reporting a fall in earnings we examine firms' incentives to manage earnings upwards. While pre-managed earnings are generally employed for this purpose and computed by reversing the effect of estimated discretionary accruals on reported profit (Cornett et al., 2008) , this approach can result in spurious correlations (DeFond and Park, 1997; Peasnell et al., 2005) . We therefore follow the approach of Peasnell et al. (2005) and use thresholds based on the Cash Flow from Operating Activities (CF) rather than pre-managed earnings. Specifically, two dummy variables are used to reflect managers' incentives to manage earnings upwards: CF Fall, which takes the value of 1 where CF 0 oCF −1 and 0 otherwise, and CF Loss where CF 0 o0 and 0 otherwise. H2 predicts that firms anticipating either a loss (proxied by CF Loss) or a fall in reported earnings (proxied by CF Fall) engage in income-increasing earnings management through negative accruals. Here we question whether the incentives to do so differ with the degree of MD equity ownership.
Leverage, industry, firm size, growth, firm age and the presence of a non-managing, majority shareholder are included in the regressions as control variables.
Empirical method
Two hypotheses are tested using a number of regression models. Reflecting the crosssectional data set an OLS estimator is employed throughout. First, we test whether the magnitude of discretionary accruals varies either linearly or non-linearly with the percentage ownership of the MD. This is tested by regressing discretionary accruals on the percentage ownership of the MD and its quadratic term; this is shown in the following equations:
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We first estimate Equation (5), which includes a linear MD% term to determine whether discretionary accruals are a linear function of managerial ownership. We then estimate Equation (6), including the quadratic term MD% 2 . We predict a negative β 1 when the quadratic ownership term is excluded, and a negative coefficient on β 1 and a positive coefficient on β 2 , when the quadratic term in included, indicating support for a non-linear relationship in that the magnitude of discretionary accruals falls then rises as managerial ownership increases. As results of White's (1980) tests indicating heteroskedacity, robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported.
The second hypothesis examines if firms managed by an MD owning a low percentage of equity will engage in greater income-increasing earnings management when firm performance is poor. This question is based on the expectation that MDs have incentives to increase earnings when they descend below particular thresholds. These incentives may vary inversely with the shareholding of the MD and arise due to contractual relationships with their employer which relate, either explicitly or implicitly, outcomes such as compensation and tenure to reported financial performance. To test this question, we estimate four models including interactions between variables measuring managerial ownership and variables measuring poor firm performance. These models are estimated on the income-increasing sample only. The following equations include combinations of two managerial ownership variables (MD High and MD Low) and two firm performance variables (CF Loss and CF Fall ): 
The main variables of interest are the interaction terms (β 3 ) which indicate if the percentage of MD shareholding moderates the relationship between a cash flow loss/fall and the use of income-increasing earnings management. A positive coefficient is predicted for β 3 in Equation (7), indicating that firms with a low MD's share ownership engage in more earnings management when firm performance is poor (i.e. when CF Loss ¼ 1). Equation (8) is similar to Equation (7) but includes MD High, rather than MD Low, in which the MD's share ownership is more than 1 standard deviation greater than the sample mean. A negative coefficient is predicted for β 3 in Equation (8). We replicate Equations (7) and (8), but include CF Fall, rather than CF Loss, as a measure of poor firm performance, as detailed in Equations (9) and (10); the predictions for the coefficients are the same as those in Equations (7) and (8).
Results
The descriptive statistics and results of the regression models are outlined in this section. Summary statistics for the full sample, the sample of firms reporting income-increasing DAC and the sample of firms reporting income-decreasing DAC are presented in Table II . The characteristics of the subsamples are compared in Table III and Table IV (5) and (6)). For the second hypothesis, estimates from Equations (7)- (10) are provided in Table VI . Finally, diagnostic and sensitivity tests are reported.
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Descriptive statistics
The analysis of the relationship between discretionary accruals and managerial ownership examines the full sample and the income-increasing discretionary accruals sample and income-decreasing discretionary accruals samples separately for H1, and the income- increasing discretionary accruals sample only for H2. To determine whether there are significant differences between the characteristics of these samples we report summary statistics for each sample separately and parametric and non-parametric test statistics are provided comparing the income-increasing and income-decreasing samples. These statistics are provided in Tables II and III[3] . As shown in Table II , the three managerial ownership variables indicate a high level of share ownership by MDs. In the full sample, the mean shareholding of the MD (MD%) is 44.2 per cent but with a significant minority (22.8 per cent) of firms managed by an outsider or low shareholding MDs (owning less than 9.96 per cent of equity in the firm). MD High and MD Low represent the extremes of insider ownership in the sample. Table III shows a comparison between the income-increasing and income-decreasing samples. The difference between the absolute means of the income-increasing and incomedecreasing DAC is not statistically significant. Statistically significant differences between the samples are evident with the income-increasing DAC sample having lower ROA, Age, and Growth and higher Leverage and CF than the income-decreasing discretionary accruals sample. There are no significant differences between the samples in respect of firm size or managerial ownership.
Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample are presented in Table IV . DAC is positively correlated with AWCA, ROA and Growth and measures of managerial ownership, MD% and MD High. DAC is also positively related to the measures of poor firm performance, CF Loss and CF Fall, which indicate current year cash flow from operations is negative and lower than the previous year, respectively. Big 4, ln Age and Leverage are negatively correlated with DAC. The three variables measuring MD ownership, MD%, MD Low and MD High, are highly correlated as each variable is measuring an aspect of the same underlying characteristic. As only one variable appears in any model this result will not give rise to multicollinearity. The correlation coefficients between ROA and several other firm characteristics, ln Turnover, Leverage and Growth, CF Loss and CF Fall, are all significant. Leverage is correlated with firm age, Growth and Big 4. The mean (maximum) VIFs for each regression model estimated range from 1.10 to 1.23 (1.26 to 2.30) and indicate that multicollinearity is not a significant concern in these data. Figure 1 shows absolute discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) by MD percentage equity ownership quartile in the sample firms and a U-shape, at this preliminary stage, is apparent. DAC is highest in firms in the top quartile of MD ownership, at 8 per cent. DAC declines to 6.8 per cent in firms where MD ownership is between 12.5 and 40.5 per cent and is higher (7.3 per cent) for the bottom quartile of firms by MD ownership. Notes: Robust (Huber-White) standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) perform regressions on full sample, Columns (3) and (4) perform regressions on firms with income-increasing discretionary accruals only and Columns (5) and (6) 
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Earnings management Equation (5); however, the coefficient on MD% is not significantly different from 0 in the full sample or the subsamples, suggesting there is little evidence of a linear, negative relationship. This is contrary to Gabrielsen et al. (2002) who reported a linear relationship albeit between information content, rather than discretionary accruals, and managerial ownership.
H1b predicts a negative coefficient for MD% and a positive coefficient for MD% 2 which would provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship. The signs on the coefficients are as predicted, and statistically significant, but only for the income-increasing discretionary accruals sample. This suggests that discretionary accruals fall and then rise as managerial ownership rises. The coefficients on the MD% and MD% 2 , for the income-increasing sample, indicate that the lowest discretionary accruals are used by firms with 43.96 per cent MD ownership.
This differs to Yeo et al. (2002) who found a U-shape relationship for public firms but do not distinguish between income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals as they measure 088 Notes: Robust (Huber-White) standard errors in parentheses. DAC is the absolute value of income-increasing discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones approach. Growth is the one-year percentage growth in Total Assets. Leverage is Total Debt/Total Debt plus Shareholders Funds. ln Turnover is the natural log of the current year turnover. Big 4 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm's current auditor is a Big 4 firm. ROA is Return on Assets. Industry is 10 dummy variables indicating one-digit sector under the 2007 SIC classification, SIC 4 omitted. ln Age is the natural log of the number of years since firm incorporation. Outside 50% is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 where a shareholder other than the MD has a shareholding greater than 50 per cent. MD Low dummy variable coded 1 where the MD's ownership percentage is less than the sample mean −1 standard deviation. MD High dummy variable coded 1 where the MD's ownership percentage is greater than the sample mean MD ownership +1 standard deviation. CF Loss is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports a negative Cash Flow from Operations in the current year. CF Fall is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CF 0 oCF −1 . D indicates a dummy variable and I indicates an interaction variable. *po0.1; **po0.05; ***po0.01 Khan and Mather (2013) , who emphasised the importance of considering income-decreasing and income-increasing accruals separately for their analysis of public firms.
Several of the control variables are also significantly different from 0 in the models. Growth is positively related to DAC in each sample suggesting additional discretionary accruals are more prevalent for growth firms. Leverage is negatively related to DAC, although this relationship is not significant in the income-increasing sample. Big 4 auditor status is negatively related to DAC only in the income-decreasing sample suggesting such accruals are lower when a Big 4 auditor is employed. Firm age is negatively related to DAC, older firms appear to use less discretionary accruals and this relationship is significant in each sample. ROA is negatively related to DAC in the income-increasing sub-sample and positively related to DAC in the income-decreasing sub-sample, providing support for the use of DAC to increase profitability for poor performing firms. Monitoring by an outside majority shareholder, as measured by the variable Outside 50, does not appear to influence the use of discretionary accruals [4] . Table VI presents the results of regressions including the interaction terms between CF Loss and CF Fall and managerial ownership which are used to test the second hypothesis. For clarity, given that we predict only firms with poor performance will wish to enhance their accounting earnings, we limit our presentation of the results to the income-increasing sample only [5] .
There appears to be a greater use of income-increasing accruals when managerial ownership is low and cash flow is negative, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient for the dummy variable MD Low × CF Loss. These results are consistent with H2, which predicts that firms managed by MDs owning less than 9.96 per cent of equity (MD Low ¼ 1) manage earnings upwards in response to poor firm performance to a greater degree than firms owned by MD's with equity ownership greater than 9.96 per cent. These findings suggest that managers in these firms are motivated to disguise firm poor performance. This conjecture is supported by the insignificant coefficient for the pertinent variables in Equation (8).
The second measure of poor firm performance used is a decline in Cash Flow from Operations. The interpretation of the results is similar to that of Equations (7) and (8), although the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are lower. Consistent with H2, the coefficient on MD Low × CF Fall is positive and significant. This provides further evidence of opportunistic earnings management by MDs who own low or no equity. The MD High × CF Loss coefficient is not significantly different from 0 suggesting MDs do not tend to use discretionary accruals to improve earnings when a negative cash flow is indicated when they have high ownership. 
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We perform a number of additional tests to confirm that the results are robust to the exclusion of outliers and influential observations. Each model is re-estimated using unwinsorised variables. In each case the sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients is very similar to that reported here.
Fan (2007), Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) suggested that firms engage in income-increasing accruals prior to an initial public offering. Only two firms in our sample completed an IPO within a year of our observations. The analysis was repeated excluding these firms. The results are identical to those presented earlier.
Alternative measure of discretionary accruals
As a robustness check, we employ an alternative measure to proxy for earnings management. We repeat the analysis described above using abnormal working capital accruals estimated using the Defond and Park (2001) method. This approach models a firm's expected working capital accruals in the current year using the ratio of its prior year's working capital accruals to sales:
where for firm i at time t, AWCA is abnormal working capital accruals, WC is non-cash working capital and S is sales. The sign of the AWCA is used to partition observations into income-increasing and income-decreasing samples. The absolute AWCAs are scaled by lagged Total Assets and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. Summary statistics for the AWCAs are provided in Table II [6] . Table VII presents the results of re-estimating regressions (5)-(10) with abnormal working capital accruals included as the dependant variable. The results of the analysis, employing AWCAs as a proxy for earnings management, provide limited support for our main findings. AWCAs are positively related to MD ownership in the full sample only. The signs on the MD and MD 2 coefficients in the income-increasing sample are the same as in Table V but the MD coefficient is not significantly different from 0. Table VIII reports evidence on the interaction between poor firm performance, managerial ownership and AWCAs. The key variables of interest are the interaction terms between MD High or Low and CF Fall or Loss. H2 predicts a positive and significant coefficient on MD Low × CF Loss and MD Low × CF Fall. In both cases, the coefficients are positive but not significantly different from 0. These results provide limited support for H2.
Discussion and conclusions
Public and private firms face different demands from shareholders and creditors for accounting information and these distinct demand environments are associated with lower earnings quality in private firms compared to public firms. There is an extensive literature on the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management in public firms but this question has received little empirical attention in the context of private firms. It is not obvious that empirical findings in public firms will generalise to private firms.
Earnings management, through the use of discretionary accruals, does not in itself change the cash flows of the firm. It does, however, affect the pattern and timing of reported earnings and if contractual outcomes for managers depend on reported profits then earnings management can alter the allocation of firm cash flows between managers and shareholders. This suggests that managers may behave opportunistically to manage earnings. Incentives to divert firm resources from shareholders appear to only arise where Notes: Robust (Huber-White) standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) perform regressions on full sample, Columns (3) and (4) perform regressions on firms with income-increasing abnormal working capital accruals only and Columns (5) and (6) 
663
Earnings management managerial equity ownership falls below a certain level suggesting opportunistic concerns may prevail. This study examines whether discretionary accruals vary with managerial ownership and differs from the existing literature addressing this relationship through focussing on private firms, which differ systematically from public firms in the UK with respect to ownership structure. It also considers whether private firms with low managerial ownership manage earnings differently to firms with intermediate or high levels of managerial ownership when faced with poor firm performance.
The results show that, considering both income-increasing discretionary accruals and income-decreasing discretionary accruals together, there is no statistically significant relationship with managerial ownership. Income-increasing discretionary accruals, considered in isolation, however, are related to managerial ownership in a U-shaped manner. Discretionary accruals fall and then rise as managerial ownership increases, with the relationship appearing to reverse direction where the MD owns 44 per cent of equity in the firm. The results suggest that firms with both high and low levels of managerial AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals. Growth is the one-year percentage growth in Total Assets. Leverage is Total Debt/ Total Debt plus Shareholders Funds. ln Turnover is the natural log of the current year turnover. Big 4 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm's current auditor is a Big 4 firm. ROA is Return on Assets. Industry is 10 dummy variables indicating one-digit sector under the 2007 SIC classification, SIC 4 omitted. ln Age is the natural log of the number of years since firm incorporation. Outside 50% is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 where a shareholder other than the MD has a shareholding greater than 50 per cent. MD Low dummy variable coded 1 where the MD's ownership percentage is less than the sample mean −1 standard deviation. MD High dummy variable coded 1 where the MD's ownership percentage is greater than the sample mean MD ownership +1 standard deviation. CF Loss is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports a negative Cash Flow from Operations in the current year. CF Fall is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CF 0 oCF −1 . D indicates a dummy variable and I indicates an interaction variable. *p o0.1; **p o 0.05; ***p o 0.01 The second question addressed in this study is whether this observed earnings management behaviour is opportunistic. At high levels of managerial ownership, it would seem unlikely that this behaviour is opportunistic in the sense of managers diverting firm resources as managers are in most cases the largest shareholder and often the only shareholder. Firms face a range of other incentives to manage earnings including influencing third parties such as trade creditors, lenders, suppliers and tax authorities. We hypothesise that opportunistic earnings management would be indicated if firms with low levels of MD ownership manage earnings upward to a greater extent when faced with poor firm performance than other firms. The results suggest that this is the case. Where managerial ownership is high (greater than 78.48 per cent) there is no significant interaction between poor firm performance and discretionary accruals. Where managerial ownership is low (below 9.96 per cent) discretionary accruals are higher when firm performance is poor. An implication of this result is that different factors drive earnings management behaviour where managerial ownership is high.
Policy implications of this work suggest that non-managing shareholders in private firms face considerable agency costs, in particular where managerial ownership is very low or very high. Rational investors, anticipating the future impact of agency costs may choose not to invest in these firms or reduce the value placed on the firms to reflect the expected costs associated with agency conflicts. The finding that discretionary accruals are greater when managerial ownership is high may be particularly problematic for new shareholders who are less likely than existing shareholders to be integrated into the "insider access" model through which information flows from private firms to shareholders (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) . As outside investors are more likely to be dependent on financial reports to monitor the firm, agency costs arising both from misalignment of incentives and managerial entrenchment may both reduce access to external equity and increase the cost of that equity.
Notes
1. In the subsequent analysis, we assume that discretionary accruals are the focus of earnings management. We acknowledge that earning manipulation can emerge through real activities such as discretionary firm spending and can result in a trade-off between both forms of earning management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) .
2. We amend the sample to provide at least ten observations per two-digit SIC code. This results in a reduction of the sample from 1,223 firms to 1,028.
3. Firms are assigned to the income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals samples based on the sign of the discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones Model. For the AWCA measure, the number of firms assigned to the income-increasing and Income-decreasing samples is based on the sign of the abnormal working capital accruals estimated using the Defond and Park (2001) model.
For each regression that includes
Outside 50, we repeat the analysis with dummy variables indicating the presence of a single outside shareholder with 60, 70 and 80 per cent ownership. In each case, the coefficient is not significantly different from 0.
5. The analysis was repeated on the income-decreasing sample and there was no evidence of a significant interaction between managerial ownership and poor firm performance. Results of this analysis are available from the authors on request.
6. Seven sample firms are missing a variable required to estimate AWCA using Equation (11). These firms are excluded from this robustness test, leaving a sample of 1,021.
